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￿ China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, adopted in 2007, is largely compatible with anti-
trust law in the European Union, the United States and other jurisdictions. Enfor-
cement activity by the Chinese authorities is also approaching the level seen
in the EU. The Chinese law, however, leaves significant room for the use of com-
petition policy to further industrial policy objectives.
￿ The data presented in this Policy Contribution indicates that Chinese merger
control might have asymmetrically targeted foreign companies, while favou-
ring domestic companies.
￿ However, there are no indications that antitrust control has been used to favour
domestic players.
￿ A strategy to achieve convergence in global antitrust enforcement should
include support for Chinese competition authorities to develop the institutio-
nal tools they already have, and to improve merger control by promoting the
adoption of a consumer-oriented test and enforcing M&A notification rules.
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INTRODUCTION
European and US companies are increasingly
asking if they are at a disadvantage in global mar-
kets because of disparities between domestic and
foreign approaches to competition and industrial
policies. A common concern is that antitrust
enforcement and regulatory control in companies’
home jurisdictions, if strictly implemented, could
lead to a reduction in companies’ profits to the
benefit of consumers, draining resources that
could potentially be used by companies to com-
pete in foreign markets1. Meanwhile, emerging
economies might adopt more flexible regulatory
approaches that could in some instances disguise
support for domestic companies. Merger policies,
for example, can be used to select, build-up and
empower national champions, so that they face
reduced competitive pressure and their total prof-
its are increased at the expense of their domestic
consumers (who would pay higher prices and
experience lower quality products).
Conversely, emerging countries are sometimes
accused of using antitrust enforcement or merger
control defensively to impose restrictions on for-
eign firms attempting to enter their markets. For
example, imposing unnecessary remedies as a
condition for clearing a merger, which could even
imply that companies cede some autonomy to
public authorities, might reduce the ability of for-
eign firms to compete, to the benefit of domestic
players. The same applies to state aid: centralised
economies are often accused of heavily subsidis-
ing their national champions through direct
money transfer or through indirect measures to
reduce their production costs, such as low loan
interest rates or land rents.
Because of the significance of the competitive
pressure exerted by China as the most prominent
emerging economy, this concern has crystallised
around China’s approach to merger and antitrust
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control2, 3. The Chinese approach to the market
economy still lags behind the most advanced
jurisdictions such as the EU and US. China’s reluc-
tance to abandon its ‘national champion’ rhetoric,
the extensive use of direct or indirect subsidies
and the still significant role played by state owned
enterprises (SOEs), for example, suggest that the
Chinese economy still requires significant reforms
to enhance the performance of its domestic mar-
kets. Nevertheless, China has made significant
steps to open markets to competition. With China's
entry to the World Trade Organisation in 2001,
import tariffs and barriers to foreign direct invest-
ment were dramatically reduced, and private
investment strongly encouraged. The progress
made by China in opening its market in the last 30
years has been deemed ‘extraordinary’ (OECD,
2010).
A correct implementation of competition policy
would take short-term and long-term effects into
account, ensuring that customers can access
products or services at a competitive price with-
out removing incentives to innovate. We analyse
China’s actual enforcement of merger control
since the implementation of China’s Anti-Monop-
oly Law in 2008. Merger control in particular
appears to have been used by the Chinese author-
ities to protect competitors instead of protecting
competition. However, the same does not seem to
hold for Chinese antitrust enforcement.
Two limitations of this Policy Contribution should
be stressed. The first is that the analysis depends
on observable cases. The Chinese competition
framework is however relatively young, and the
sample of pursued investigations is still too small
to allow refined statistical analysis (particularly in
the case of antitrust). Moreover, lack of trans-
parency on the part of the Chinese authorities, and
the limited amount of information available in the
public domain, limit our ability to assess the sub-
stance of decisions. More cases will be pursued03
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since increased: five decisions were taken in
2009; four in 2010. The bulk of actual enforce-
ment kicked-in from 2011, particularly because of
anti-cartel enforcement: nine decisions were
taken in that year. In 2012, 16 decisions were
taken, followed by ten in the first eight months of
2013. The enforcement-activity gap with the Euro-
pean Commission has reduced: in 2013 (to date)
the Commission has published just five major
decisions more than the Chinese authorities.
In language and structure, the AML resembles the
antitrust laws of western countries but, in contrast
to other jurisdictions, it does not only pursue the
anti-competitive behaviour of private companies;
it also addresses abuse of power by public admin-
istrations if they are responsible for altering or
eliminating competition (Fels, 2012). This norm
was introduced in particular to address the issue
of artificial internal market segmentation, and to
prevent local governments from protecting locally
based companies by placing unnecessary admin-
istrative burdens on external competition.
Notably, article 7 of the AML provides for a special
framework for state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
that play a key role in ‘lifeline’ industries for the
national economy. Such a framework might
explain why few mergers involving SOEs have
been investigated by the Chinese competition
authorities.
The AML aims to prevent the approval of mergers
that would have a likely negative effect on welfare,
anticompetitive agreements such as price-fixing,
soon and transparency in investigative process in
China is expected to be enhanced. We therefore
expect to be able to complement our research with
additional evidence in the future. The second lim-
itation is that the analysis reported in this policy
contribution is static; it does not explore how
enforcement patterns in China might have
affected companies’ decisions to locate in differ-
ent geographical areas, or might have influenced
multinational companies’ global merger and
acquisition strategies4.
2 THE CHINESE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
China’s competition policy regime is based on the
Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), which was adopted in
2007 and entered into force in January 2008. The
adoption of a comprehensive package of compe-
tition policy norms marked the end of a gradual
process during which measures to address spe-
cific competition issues were put in place5. Since
the introduction of the AML, there has been a con-
stant increase in enforcement activity by the Chi-
nese antitrust authorities (Figure 1). The columns
in Figure 1 show how many major decisions that
had an impact on companies’ assets or conduct
were taken by the Chinese and EU competition
authorities between 2008 and 20136. In 2008,
only one such a decision was published by the
Chinese authorities: the first conditional clearance
for a merger in the brewery market (InBev/
Anheuser-Busch)7. During the same period, the
European Commission published 34 major deci-
sions. However, enforcement activity in China has
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Figure 1: Competition policy enforcement, 2008-13, number of decisions
Source: Bruegel based on DG COMP (for EU). For China: MOFCOM; SAIC and NDRC do not have official registries for antitrust, so we
reverted to studies conducted by law firms and research centres. Note: * up to August. Mergers: conditional clearances + prohi-
bitions. Antitrust: sanctioned cases of abuse of dominance. Cartels: major sanctioned cartels.and abuse of market power by dominant compa-
nies. The main institutions in charge of enforcing
the AML are the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM),
which is responsible for mergers and monopolis-
tic practices related to international trade; the
National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC), responsible for abuse of dominance and
anti-competitive agreements directly related to
pricing issues; and the State Administration for
Industry and Commerce (SAIC), which focuses on
abuses related to non-pricing issues. Other bodies
playing a role in coordination and enforcement are
the Anti-Monopoly Committee, the State Council
and the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Agency.
The complexity of the institutional setting makes
it often difficult to identify decision-makers. The
ability of companies to anticipate the likely out-
come of a process is therefore limited, making
deterrence against infringements and encourage-
ment of potentially beneficial conduct (such as
cooperation agreements that would foster invest-
ment in research and development) more difficult.
In particular the separation of responsibility for
pricing and non-pricing issues appears artificial,
since any antitrust law infringement usually have
effects in both areas. This also makes it difficult to
understand the reasoning of decisions ex-post,
leaving scope for speculation that decisions have
been taken to pursue political objectives, such as
protection of Chinese enterprises. The Chinese
authorities have recently flagged their intention to
increase transparency by disclosing information
on ongoing and concluded investigations8.
The AML introduces for the first time in China uni-
versal merger control regardless of the origin of
the companies involved. The authorisation proce-
dure resembles the one implemented under the
EU merger regulation (Regulation (EC) No
139/2004): after notification, MOFCOM has 30
days to investigate the existence of potential com-
petition concerns. A second phase of 90 days for
a deeper investigation follows if preliminary con-
cerns are identified during the first phase. The
merger can gain full clearance, be cleared subject
to commitments that address concerns about a
potential reduction in competition due to the
merger, or be blocked. Interestingly, the substan-
tive test used by the Chinese authorities to iden-
tify potential concerns is broader in scope than
that implemented by the European Commission
or the US antitrust authorities. Among the factors
considered by the Chinese authorities are not only
potential drawbacks for consumers, but also fac-
tors that could negatively affect ‘the national eco-
nomic development’9. The merger moreover may
be allowed if the ‘concentration is pursuant to
public interest’10. And if ‘state security’ is involved,
a further test is conducted whenever a foreign
investor is involved in the merger11.
Likewise, the provisions of the AML on anticom-
petitive agreements and abuse of dominance are
partially consistent with those governing antitrust
intervention in Europe12. Notably, the AML pro-
hibits ‘exploitative abuse’ (that is the practice of a
dominant company charging an unfair price). The
provision resembles article 102 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union, but is
absent from US law. In common with the provi-
sions on mergers, however, the AML gives greater
room for manoeuvre to enforcers in case in which
abuses might be deemed to be in the national
interest. For example, similar to what is prescribed
by EU law, the AML lists exceptions to the applica-
tion of the law against anti-competitive agree-
ments13. Two of those exceptions, however, do not
require that consumers share a substantial part of
the benefit arising from not enforcing the law (a
condition that always applies in Europe): if agree-
ments ‘protect foreign trade interests’ or if they
‘pursue other interests as defined by the State
Council’.
The provisions of the Anti-Monopoly Law therefore
are partly consistent with Western economies’
competition policy frameworks, in that they pro-
vide for a substantive test of the impact on com-
petition and consumers of the merger or
anti-competitive conduct. In western jurisdictions,
however, public interest can play a role only in
exceptional and well-identified circumstances. For
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‘Among the factors that the Chinese authorities consider to identify antitrust concerns are not
only the potential drawbacks for consumers, but also factors that could negatively affect “the
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example, the EU merger regulation allows EU
member states to take public interest considera-
tions into account when mergers might affect
public security, plurality of media or prudential
rules14. A general provision in the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, moreover,
explicitly grants member states autonomy in the
treatment of issues concerning the defence
sector15. But these are exceptions that are rarely
applied and when they are, they require antitrust
authorities to follow an explicit and transparent
ad-hoc procedure.
The Chinese law instead formally leaves the door
open to industrial policy considerations in the
substantive assessment of any case dealt with by
antitrust authorities. National interest is therefore
not an exceptional instance requiring special
treatment. It is rather one of the main elements to
be considered when assessing the impact of a
merger or an antitrust case. To the extent that the
interpretation of ‘economic development’ and
‘national interest’ can be used to favour domestic
industries, the Chinese antitrust law can therefore
technically be used to pursue industrial policy
objectives16. As others have suggested (Fels,
2012), the emergence of a substantive test
aligned to those applied by the most advanced
economies therefore very much depends on
actual implementation by the Chinese antitrust
authority. 
3 ACTUAL ENFORCEMENT: MERGERS
In the first five years of enforcement, MOFCOM
received 754 merger notifications (up to June
2013) and ultimately assessed 692 of those. The
great majority of decisions – 97 percent – were
clearance with no commitments; 3 percent of
cases were cleared with commitments. Only one
merger was blocked: Coca-Cola/Huiyuan17 (see
Table 1). During the same five years, the European
Commission received 1644 merger notifications,
95 percent of the 1531 assessed cases were
cleared with no commitments, 5 percent with
commitments. Four mergers were blocked. As
Figure 2 shows, China has been handling an
increasing number of mergers since the adoption
of the AML.
Table 1: Conditional clearances and prohibitions in Chinese merger control
Date Case Buyer country
of origin
Target country
of origin
Only foreign com-
panies involved
Type of
remedy
Prohibitions
18 Mar 2009 Coca Cola/Huiyuan US China mixed -
Conditionally cleared
18 Nov2008 InBev /Anheuser-Busch Belgium US  yes Behavioural
24 April 2009 Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite Japan UK yes Combined
28 Sept 2009 GM/Delphi US US yes Behavioural
29 Sept 2009 Pfizer/Wyeth US US yes Combined
30 Oct 2009 Panasonic/Sanyo Japan Japan yes Combined
13 Aug 2010 Novartis/Alcon Switzerland Switzerland yes Behavioural
02 June 2011 Uralkali/Silvinit Russia Russia yes Behavioural
31 Oct 2011 Penelope (AlphaV)/ Savio France Italy yes Structural
10 Nov 2011 GE/Shenhua Group JV US China mixed Behavioural
12 Dec 2011 Seagate/Samsung US Korea yes Behavioural
10 Feb 2012 Henkel Hong Kong/Tiande Chemical
(joint venture)
Germany China yes Behavioural
02 Mar 2012 Western Digital/Hitachi US Japan yes Combined
19 May 2012 Google/Motorola US US yes Behavioural
15 June 2012 Goodrich/UTC US US yes Structural
14 Aug 2012 Walmart/Niuhai US China mixed Behavioural
06 Dec 2012 Advanced RISC Machines/G&D/Gemalto JV UK, Germany, Netherlands yes Behavioural
16 April 2013 Glencore/Xstrata Switzerland UK yes Combined
23 April 2013 Marubeni/Gavilon Japan US yes Behavioural
13 Aug 2013 Baxter Int./Gambro US Sweden yes Combined
27 Aug 2013 MediaTek/Mstar Semicondutor Taiwan Taiwan yes Behavioural
Source: Bruegel.THE DRAGON AWAKES: CHINESE COMPETITION POLICY Mario Mariniello
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Merger notification trends (shown in columns in
Figure 2) appear consistent across the two juris-
dictions: notifications in the EU increased from
2009 to 2011, then dropped in 2012. The same
happened with merger notifications in China. But
the gap between the absolute number of notifica-
tions in the EU and China has reduced. While there
were approximately 1.7 times more notifications
in Europe in 2009 than in China, in 2011 the figure
shrank to 1.3, and it can be expected to shrink
even more in 2013. Similar convergence is
observed in the number of mergers cleared with
conditions (represented by the lines in Figure 2).
From a substantive point of view, there appears to
be a divergence in the EU and Chinese approaches
to merger assessment. In stark contrast to the EU
approach, MOFCOM has made extensive use of
‘behavioural’ remedies as opposed to ‘structural’
remedies, as a condition to authorise a merger.
Structural remedies require the divestment of
some of the involved companies’ assets in favour
of actual or potential competitors in order to main-
tain the same level of competitive pressure in a
market which would otherwise be too concen-
trated post-merger. Behavioural remedies instead
involve a commitment to engage in a specific con-
duct to preserve the same competition conditions
after completing the merger. Examples are non-
discriminatory provisions, preventing the merged
entity from favouring the acquired target over its
competitors; price caps; mandatory licensing pro-
visions; and prohibitions on the sharing of infor-
mation within the merged entity. Structural
remedies are desirable from a social welfare point
of view. They are much more likely to be effective
in counteracting the potential negative effects of a
merger because once they are implemented they
do not require the intervention of antitrust author-
ities. Conversely, behavioural remedies require ex-
post monitoring, a difficult exercise to perform,
particularly if antitrust authorities lack resources.
Moreover, behavioural remedies may distort com-
panies’ incentives to compete or to fully exploit
the efficiencies brought about by the merger. For
example non-discrimination clauses may reduce
the total supply of a certain product, reducing con-
sumer welfare (Motta, 2004).
Although structural remedies are more efficient
and MOFCOM is severely under-staffed (according
to Reuters, MOFCOM’s antimonopoly merger
bureau can count on about 10-12 case handlers;
the European Commission’s Directorate General
for Competition has 124 officials and external
experts assessing mergers assisted by 25 econ-
omists from the Chief Economist Team18), Chinese
authorities made extensive use of behavioural
remedies in the first five years of enforcement of
the AML (Figure 3). Behavioral remedies were
used in 60 percent of the commitment decisions,
as opposed to 20 percent for structural remedies.
During the same period, only 7 percent of EU com-
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mitment decisions entailed only behavioural
remedies, while 77 percent imposed structural
remedies.
There might be two reasons for China’s preference
for behavioural remedies. First, for antitrust
authorities in their infancy, behavioural remedies
have a ‘marketing value’: they are relatively easy
to impose compared to structural remedies. They
signal to the outside world that the authority is vig-
ilant and that merger investigations produce con-
crete outcomes. In other words, they help to
promote a competition policy culture and to jus-
tify the use of public resources for enforcement.
This is particularly evident when commitments to
‘honour’ existing agreements are imposed (for
instance, in the decision taken by MOFCOM on
Google/Motorola, the parties were required to
abide by their fair, reasonable and non-discrimi-
natory commitment to license their standard
essential patents). These types of remedy how-
ever do not impose any further burden on the par-
ties or increase the probability that competition
will be increased by the merger: to the extent that
the parties were already bound by the law to such
conduct, a formal commitment to respect the law
is redundant.
Second, behavioural remedies can be used to
pursue objectives that go beyond competition
policy and can leave some room for control by the
Chinese authorities after the merger has taken
place. In Uralkali/Silvinit, the parties were required
to maintain a certain quantity and quality level in
potassium chloride products and to report period-
ically to MOFCOM. In Henkel Hong Kong/Tiande,
MOFCOM prohibited the merged entity from charg-
ing too-high prices once the merger had been
completed. This is unusual for competition author-
ities, as their aim should be to maximise market
self-sufficiency and avoid ex-post regulation,
which may have ambiguous welfare effects.
Most importantly, Chinese authorities have in sev-
eral instances used behavioural remedies to pro-
tect competitors instead of protecting competition
(to the extent that those remedies were effective).
In at least five of the 12 decisions in which the
merger was cleared subject to behavioural condi-
tions, the ‘enhanced’ competitiveness of the
merged entity was quoted as a factor motivating
the remedies. In Inbev/Anheuser-Bush and Wal-
Mart/Niu Hai, the parties were prohibited from
entering into a specific line of business. In Novar-
tis/Alcon, the parties were required not to relaunch
a Novartis product. In Marubeni/Gavilon the par-
ties were prohibited from exploiting synergies that
would reduce wholesale costs and increase
Marubeni’s competitiveness in the supply of soya
beans to the Chinese market. In Mediatek/Mstar
the parties were required to seek MOFCOM autho-
risation before conducting business cooperation,
as the merger would make it more difficult for
potential and existing competitors to compete
with the parties. These decisions are not consis-
tent with a sound economic approach, because an
increase in the competitiveness of the merged
entity is normally beneficial for the economy and
for consumers; remedies specifically conceived
to limit the parties’ increase in competitiveness
are detrimental, and suggest that Chinese merger
control aims to promote pro-domestic objectives.
The very same misconception of competition law
seems to have played a key role in the assess-
ment of the only blocking decision taken so far by
the Chinese competition authorities: Coca
Cola/Huiyuan (see Box 1 on the next page).
Confirmation of a pro-domestic bias comes from
the analysis of merger decisions on the basis of
the origin of the companies involved. In broad
terms, merger control bites only when the merg-
ing parties have a non-negligible share of at least
one of the markets supplied by the parties. There-
fore, the number or the value of all M&As com-
pleted may provide no direct information on how
many mergers should be expected to be deemed
problematic by competition authorities. However,
it is reasonable to expect a positive correlation
between the value of M&A activities and the
number of domestic mergers requiring conditional
clearance. The bigger the number of M&As, the
greater the value, the higher the probability that
among those attempted mergers there would be
one likely to cause a significant impediment to
competition. Between 2008 and 2013, non-for-
eign mergers in the EU (that is: mergers between
companies within one EU country or originating in
different EU countries) represented about 3.6 per-
cent of average EU GDP19. Compared to this figure,
we observe that 60 percent of the mergers that
were not unconditionally cleared by the European08
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Commission during the same period were domes-
tic, according to the same definition used above20.
In the same period, Chinese domestic mergers
represented 3.7 percent of average Chinese GDP.
However none of the non-conditionally cleared
mergers are domestic.
These numbers seem to confirm the view that
merger control is not uniformly applied with regard
to the origin of merging companies. One may
argue that, China being an emerging economy,
M&A is more likely to be a way towards efficient
restructuring of industrial sectors, which is natural
in the course of the evolution of the national econ-
omy. This would therefore explain why domestic
mergers tend to be unconditionally cleared. Still, it
seems implausible that during five years of
enforcement no domestic merger could be
deemed capable of harming market competition,
particularly because Chinese domestic mergers
appear to have involved significant amounts of
assets and therefore were arguably more likely to
trigger competition concerns.
A more lenient approach by MOFCOM towards
domestic mergers is however not the only possi-
ble reason why no domestic merger has so far
ended up with a conditional clearance decision.
The other plausible explanation is that domestic
companies simply fail to notify their merger even
if they are supposed to. Figure 4 compares the
number of merger decisions taken by EU and Chi-
nese antitrust authorities between the fourth
quarter of 2012 and the third quarter of 2013.
During that period, 269 decisions were taken by
the European Commission. Almost half of them
concerned domestic mergers. During the same
period, MOFCOM took 218 decisions. Amongst
them, only 32, or 15 percent, concerned purely
domestic mergers21.
This appears even more surprising considering
that on average, Chinese mergers involve bigger
assets than European mergers. According to Merg-
ermarket M&A Data, the mean value of the assets
involved in Chinese deals during the period 2008-
2013 was €149 million. The corresponding figure
for European deals is €70 million.
BOX 1: THE COCA-COLA / HUIYUAN JUICE GROUP MERGER PROHIBITION
Since the adoption of the AML, MOFCOM has blocked only one merger: Coca-Cola’s attempt to buy
China’s number one private company in the juice market, Huiyuan Juice Group. The prohibition deci-
sion was issued on 18 March 2009, six months after notification. Coca-Cola made two offers of reme-
dies, which were deemed insufficient to alleviate MOFCOM’s concerns.
MOFCOM’s substantive assessment identified three concerns: (1) Coca-Cola’s incentive to leverage
its dominant position in the carbonated soft drink market to reinforce Huiyuan’s position in the
market for fruit juice; (2) the unfair advantage that Coca-Cola’s branding would have given to Huiyuan,
making entry into the market allegedly more difficult; (3) the negative effect on the ability of small
and medium-sized enterprises ability to compete in the juice market. 
The information published by MOFCOM does not allow for an exhaustive assessment of the deci-
sion, but there seem to be clear indications that the identified concerns are not backed up by eco-
nomic reasoning. In particular, the Chinese authority may have overestimated the likelihood of abuse
of dominance after the merger and seems to have followed an erroneous approach sometimes
referred to as ‘efficiency offence’: the merger would have increased Coca-Cola’s competitiveness at
the expenses of smaller rivals but to the benefit of consumers, who could have shared Coca-Cola’s
efficiency gain in the form of lower prices. 
MOFCOM’s approach could therefore be criticised for economic patriotism or for having erroneously
protected competitors instead of protecting competition. It is interesting to note, however, that other
competition authorities have made similar mistakes (see, for example, the heavily criticised prohi-
bition of the GE/Honeywell merger in 2001, where similar arguments were put forward by the Euro-
pean Commission). The prohibition of the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan deal may have been due to the Chinese
authority’s inexperience, rather than to a well-thought through industrial policy plan to defend
national producers.09
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Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect a
greater involvement of domestic companies in the
mergers investigated by MOFCOM. Chinese com-
panies should notify whenever the combined
turnover within China of all undertakings involved
in the merger in the preceding financial year
exceeds RMB 200 billion (approximately €240
million) and the turnover of at least two of the
involved companies each exceeds RMB 400 mil-
lion (approximately €48 million). These thresh-
olds do not seem particularly high compared to
other jurisdictions, and a significant number of
deals should qualify for notification. Lack of
awareness of legal obligations may explain why
Chinese companies do not notify. Likewise, com-
panies may not be seriously concerned about the
consequences of failing to notify. Fines may not
be high enough to dissuade them from attempt-
ing to hide acquisitions, or public enforcement
may not be deemed a credible threat22. The Chi-
nese authorities seem aware of this issue and
have recently signalled that they are increasing
their efforts to enforce notification rules23. How-
ever, to our knowledge, no company has until now
been sanctioned for failing to file a merger.
Lastly, bigger companies may count on the tacit
approval of public authorities, particularly in
strategic sectors. State-owned enterprises (SOEs)
have been undergoing a constant restructuring
process during the last few years, especially
thanks to consolidation24. But Chinese merger
control does not seem to really apply to SOEs: a
merger between the two biggest telecom
operators in China (China Unicom and China
Netcom) in 2008 was not notified to MOFCOM (Li,
2009); restructuring in key industrial sectors has
led to the creation of over 100 ‘national
champions’ since the adoption of the AML (Lin and
Zhao, 2012); in 2012, the biggest 110 state-
owned enterprises conducted 918 M&A deals
(Wei Tan, 2013). Yet amongst the 20 merger
decisions cleared with commitments until now,
only one involved an SOE (and a foreign buyer):
Ge/Shenhua25.
4 ACTUAL ENFORCEMENT: ABUSE OF
DOMINANCE AND ANTI-COMPETITIVE
AGREEMENTS
Abuse of dominance cases and anti-competitive
agreements are pursued by the National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the
State Administration for Industry and Commerce
(SAIC). Private litigation is the other channel
through which the AML can be enforced; this
policy contribution however focuses on the action
of Chinese antitrust authorities and an analysis of
Chinese courts’ legal proceedings is outside its
scope26.
So far only two cases of abuse of dominance have
been sanctioned by Chinese antitrust authorities:
Wuchang Salt Company for anticompetitive
bundling practices in the washing powder market,
and Unilever for anticipating publicly a future price
increase in household and personal care products.
A high profile investigation into Tetra-Pak for
alleged anticompetitive tying and discrimination
practices in the market for food and liquid pack-
aging has been announced and is pending27.
In terms of anticompetitive agreements, since the
adoption of the AML, more than 30 cases have led
to sanctions imposed by the Chinese authorities
(either by NDRC or SAIC, at national or provincial
level). For smaller and local cases between 2008
and 2010, no significant information has been
made public. Some information has been revealed
for 22 bigger cases, and the statistics we report
here concern those cases.
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Figure 4: Origin of merger cases
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The number of investigations has increased over
time: the first two cases were sanctioned in 2010,
in 2011 there were four sanctioned cases, 10 in
2012 and finally six in the first eight months of
2013. The vast majority of cases are cartel cases
(20 out of 22). The remaining cases concern anti-
competitive exclusive dealing agreements in the
pharmaceutical distribution sector
(Shuntong/Huaxin) and ‘resale price mainte-
nance’ agreements (White Liquor). Another major
investigation into anticompetitive agreements
was announced in 2011 and is ongoing at the time
of writing: it concerns China Telecom and China
Unicom, the two SOEs dominating the Chinese
telecommunication market, which have been
accused of implementing a type of abuse com-
monly known as ‘margin squeeze’ to keep com-
petitors out of the downstream market.
Contrary to what can be observed in merger con-
trol, the underlying motivation justifying inter-
vention by NDRC and SAIC against abuse of
dominance and anticompetitive agreements
appears to have been protection of the Chinese
consumer, with no evident bias in favour of
domestic companies or SOEs. This approach is
consistent with the approach of EU and US
antitrust authorities and is compatible with what
is suggested by economic reasoning, although in
some instances the Chinese authorities appear
more concerned about seeking consent from the
public, than about economics. In the rice noodle
cartel case, for instance, the NDRC forced the par-
ties to revert to pre-cartel pricing to “quickly sta-
bilise the rice noodle market, protect the
consumers’ legal rights and interests, and ensure
the people have a peaceful and happy Chinese
New Year”28. In Unilever, the investigation started
in the aftermath of Unilever’s announcement of a
10 percent price increase that caused Chinese
customers to ‘panic’29. Unilever was compelled to
apologise and to suspend the implementation of
the price increase. Economic reasoning would
suggest caution. Direct price control is dangerous
to the extent that it is difficult to identify the price
that would emerge in a competitive market.
Requiring a specific price level might reduce wel-
fare. It appears in these cases that antitrust has
been used more as a tool for direct price control
and for fighting inflation, rather than to preserve
market competition.
There does not appear to be any selection bias in
cases pursued according to companies’ origins30.
Although the majority (65 percent) of sanctioned
companies in Europe between 2007 and 2013
were domestic, among all the cases pursued, only
30 percent concerned cartels with no foreign com-
pany involved. Conversely, among the eight major
pure cartel cases pursued by NDRC during the
same period, six concerned cartels that involved
only Chinese companies. Only the LCD and the milk
powder cases also involved foreign companies. 
Moreover, imposed fines are much lower in China
than in Europe. Fines have been negligible if com-
pared to the fines delivered by the European Com-
mission in nominal or PPP terms (Figure 5). One
possible explanation for the difference is that ear-
lier investigations concerned cases in which the
infringement started before the adoption of the
new AML law. For those cases, the fine was set on
the basis of the old Price Law31, which implied
smaller penalties (this was the case for the LCD
cartel, for example).  However, even looking at the
more recent cases, fines levels are much lower in
China than in Europe: for 2013, when Chinese
fines peaked, the total value of fines imposed by
Chinese authorities was more than three times
smaller than the total fines imposed by the Euro-
pean Commission.
Fines are sunk costs, they do not affect the mar-
ginal cost of production and in principle they are
potentially distortive only if they are so high that
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they push companies into bankruptcy – an unre-
alistic scenario under current penalty levels in
Europe (for a discussion, see Mariniello, 2013). If
the two Chinese cartel cases involving at least one
foreign company (LCD and milk powder) are com-
pared with the average cartel case sanctioned by
the European Commission between 2008 and
2013, a significant difference in the size of the
sanction per undertaking can be observed. Com-
panies in the LCD and milk powder cases received
a fine on average of approximately €10 milion. The
average fine per undertaking in Europe is instead
€64 milion. Moreover the European Commission
imposed on average fines of 2.6 percent of the
involved companies’ global turnover, whereas for
the two cartels sanctioned by NDRC, the average
fine level was just 0.17 percent of the companies’
global turnover. Therefore, even if fines could sig-
nificantly hamper a company’s competitiveness, it
seems unrealistic to believe that current fines in
China are a tool to protect Chinese domestic indus-
try against potential European competitors
(which, for the same infringement, would face
much harsher sanctions at home). If anything, one
should point out that Chinese fines are far below
the level that would ensure deterrence of anti-
competitive behaviour by companies, regardless
of whether they are domestic or foreign.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis suggests that the Chinese institu-
tional framework for competition policy is largely
compatible with that of western economies, but
leaves more room for industrial policy considera-
tions in the assessment of competition policy
cases. This flexibility may have been used by Chi-
nese authorities to favour domestic players in the
context of merger control, but not in the context of
antitrust control. In particular, biases in merger
control appear to be due to an erroneous sub-
stantive assessment of cases resulting in the pro-
tection of competitors instead of the protection of
competition, and to a lack of enforcement of noti-
fication obligations for domestic deals.
Since the AML appears sufficiently refined to allow
for unbiased enforcement, it seems that a poten-
tially efficient avenue to achieve a level playing
field in global competition would be to support
China’s efforts to improve actual enforcement
within the boundaries of the existing institutional
framework. Exporting the consumer-oriented cul-
ture from antitrust to merger control could be a sig-
nificant step towards an approach consistent with
that adopted by more mature economies.
Requesting China to effectively enforce notifica-
tion rules by sanctioning companies that fail to file
for merger review would be another significant
step. Moreover, reducing regulatory fragmentation
by clearly defining the competences of the differ-
ent institutional actors in charge of enforcing com-
petition law and by increasing transparency,
would promote the modernisation of Chinese
antitrust control. If external assessment becomes
feasible, because decisions containing substan-
tiated information on the reasoning applied by the
authorities are made publicly available, the risk of
a biased application of competition law is min-
imised. By being more transparent, Chinese
authorities would be less exposed to the accusa-
tion that they are pursuing industrial policy objec-
tives. The differences in the approach of different
jurisdictions would naturally shrink, because
transparency would increase the inflow and out-
flow of information on procedures and would
increase the influence that China and other major
jurisdictions can mutually exert on each other.
Convergence on the same substantive assess-
ment tests and improvements in the process
would make Chinese merger control more efficient
and consistent with mainstream economic rea-
soning, bringing benefits to the Chinese domestic
economy and preserving fair competition with for-
eign companies. Convergence has also clear-cut
benefits from the perspective of companies will-
ing to do business in multiple jurisdictions,
because devising a mechanism for assessing
mergers with an international dimension that
would minimise the administrative burden on
business (for example arising from different noti-
fication procedures) is considered one of the
major issues faced by the ‘world’ of competition
law (Whish and Bailey, 2012).
International cooperation on competition policy
has been discussed in different contexts.  At a
multilateral level, developed countries have in the
past advocated the introduction of competition
policy principles in the WTO rules, though with no
success32. Ad-hoc international initiatives are car-
ried out to support coordination and cooperation12
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between antitrust authorities: in 2001 an Interna-
tional Competition Network (ICN) was created with
the objective of promoting international conver-
gence. China however declined to join: a “striking
omission in the membership of a body that plays
an important role in the development of voluntary
standards with regard to substantive policy and
procedure”(Kovacic, 2013)33. Bilateral initiatives
offer other opportunities. A Memorandum of
Understanding between Chinese and EU authori-
ties aimed at facilitating coordination and
exchange of information was signed in 2012 (the
year before a similar agreement between Chinese
and US authorities was reached). Joaquin Almu-
NOTES:
1 Generally speaking, antitrust enforcement aims to maximise consumer welfare. Most competition authorities (including
the EU and US) do this, but economists debate whether that or total welfare should be the objective of competition policy
(see Motta, 2004, for a discussion). Some argue that, under certain conditions, maximising consumer welfare yields
optimal social outcomes. See Neven and Roller (2005).
2 See, for example, the Financial Timeson 22 August 2013 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/82599dbe-08bc-11e3-ad07-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2d9ZheMKZ or China Daily Asiaon 16 September 2013
http://www.chinadailyasia.com/business/2013-09/16/content_15088331.html.
3 Competition policy is just one of the many avenues through which industrial policy can be pursued. Other include direct
subsidies or the imposition of import duties. A comprehensive analysis of all industrial policy tools is outside the scope
of this paper.
4 For such an analysis, further empirical evidence covering a longer period would be needed. Particularly challenging would
be to disentangle competition policy effects from other contingent factors, such as the 2009 global financial crisis. One
way to overcome this is to resort to surveys, although this question has not until now been dealt with by anybody in the
economic literature (foreign companies’ complaining about being negatively affected by Chinese competition authorities
are often reported in the press, instead. See for example Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/21/us-china-
antitrust-idUSBRE97K05020130821). Sokol (2012) is the only attempt we are aware of to overcome data limitation in
the analysis of Chinese competition policy with the use of survey techniques. Sokol reports evidence in support of a
general perception by practitioners across multiple jurisdictions that Chinese merger control tends to be biased in favor
of domestic companies. It does not address, however, the question as to how such a bias may affect global competition.
5 Most notably: in 1980, the ‘Promotion and Protection of Competition in the Socialist Economy’ represented a first attempt
to foster national integration by pulling down internal regional barriers to competition; in 1993, the Anti-Unfair Competition
Law prohibited unfair trading practices, such as bribery, bid-rigging, predatory below-cost sales and misleading advertising.
In 1997, the Price Law introduced norms against exploitative abuse or excessive pricing and price-fixing. A merger control
regime for acquisition by foreign companies was introduced six years later in 2003 and then improved in 2006 in response
to increasing concerns about foreign investors purchasing stakes in domestic industries. Economic patriotism and the
fear of losing control of the domestic economy appear to be among the key driving forces behind developments in the
Chinese competition policy framework.
6 These are mergers that did not end up in unconditional clearance, abuse of dominance or major cartel cases. Major
investigations may end up in unconditional clearance of a merger or of an initially alleged antitrust abuse. Public information
about those investigations (particularly from the Chinese competition authorities) is however scarce and they are therefore
not included in the calculation. This means that those figures do not provide any indication about the efficiency of
enforcement (zero activity may also indicate that companies refrain from anticompetitive conduct). The reported figures
nevertheless provide a good indication of the intensity of authorities’ enforcement activity.
7 Approximately ten cartel cases were sanctioned by NDRC between 2008 and 2010. However sanctions were negligible:
approximately RMB 50,000 or about €6,000 on average. Anti-cartel enforcement became a credible threat only from
2010, when fines ramped up to approximately RMB 1,000,000 or €121,000 per case. See
http://www.paulhastings.com/Resources/Upload/Publications/NDRC%E2%80%99s_Recent_Enforcement_of_the_PRC_Anti-
Monopoly_Law_-_A_More_Aggressive_and_Transparent_Direction.pdf
8 See http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index/content/2012-08/13/content_3767571.htm?node=20908.
nia, EU Competition Commissioner, has on a few
occasions called for more international coopera-
tion in the enforcement of competition policy34
and the European Commission has recently
flagged its intention to discuss harmonised
antitrust and merger rules for SOEs in the context
of the EU and US trade talks35.
Bilateral negotiations aimed at facilitating foreign
direct investment between the EU and China are
set to start on 24 October 2013. These may repre-
sent a key opportunity to bring the issue of con-
vergence in competition policy enforcement to the
negotiation table.13
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9 The AML lists six factors that should be taken into account by MOFCOM in its assessment: (1) the parties’ market shares
and the extent of their market power; (2) the existing level of concentration in the market; (3) the effect of the merger on
potential market entry or technological development; (4) the effect on customers (consumers or business); (5) the effect
on the national economic development; (6) other elements which could affect competition as determined by the Anti-
Monopoly Authority – Art 27, AML.
10 Art 28, AML.
11 Art 31, AML.
12 According to the AML, a dominant firm commits an abuse if: (1) sells or buy goods at an unfair price; (2) sells below cost
with no justification; (3) refuses to deal with no justification; (4) imposes exclusionary restrictions to a trading party with
no justification; (5) ties products or imposes restrictions with no justification; (6) discriminates against counterparts; (7)
other conduct is deemed as abuse by the State Council.
13 The AML prohibits horizontal and vertical anticompetitive agreements in a fashion broadly similar to EU law. It also identifies
seven different categories of exemption, for those agreements for which anticompetitive effect can be balanced by benefits:
agreements that (1) improve technological development; (2) enhance product quality or increase productive efficiency;
(3) improve the competitiveness of small and medium enterprises; (4) pursue public interest (eg environmental protection,
energy conservation, disaster relief); (5) mitigate the effects of an economic depression (crisis cartel); (6) protect foreign
trade interests (eg export cartels); (7) pursue other interests as defined by the State Council. The first five categories of
exception can be applied only if it can be shown that consumers share a significant part of the claimed benefits.
14 Art 21(4) of the European Union Merger Regulation: “[...] notwithstanding paragraphs 2 and 3, Member States may take
appropriate measures to protect legitimate interests other than those taken into consideration by this Regulation and
compatible with the general principles and other provisions of Community law. Public security, plurality of the media and
prudential rules shall be regarded as legitimate interests within the meaning of the first subparagraph. Any other public
interest must be communicated to the Commission by the Member State concerned and shall be recognised by the
Commission after an assessment of its compatibility with the general principles and other provisions of Community law
before the measures referred to above may be taken. The Commission shall inform the Member State concerned of its
decision within 25 working days of that communication”.
15 Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: “1. The provisions of the Treaties shall not preclude the
application of the following rules: (a) no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it
considers contrary to the essential interests of its security; (b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers
necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade
in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the internal
market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes”.
16 Note that this does not mean that the EU and US do not implement industrial policy measures, just that their antitrust laws
do not explicitly allow for protection of domestic industry, unless consumers share the benefits from it.
17 The decision has been criticised for being driven by industrial policy objectives (see Box 1).
18 Source: Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/02/us-mergers-regulation-china-insight-
idUSBRE94116920130502.
19 Data kindly provided by Mergermarket (www.mergermarket.com). The figures were drawn from data on M&A announced
deals, excluding lapsed and withdrawn bids and property transaction and restructurings where the ultimate shareholders'
interests are not changed, thereby covering the transactions that may fall under the reach of merger control. Chinese deals
include M&As taking place within the borders of mainland China.
20 Note, moreover, that these statistics refer only to EU merger control and do not include national merger control, therefore
most likely underestimating the number of non-unconditionally cleared domestic mergers.
21 The figure does not change if all decisions taken by MOFCOM between 2008 and 2013 are considered: 671 decisions were
taken. Amongst them, only 95, or 14 percent, concerned purely domestic mergers.
22 Article 48 of the AML: “Where any business operator implements concentration in violation of this Law, the antimonopoly
authority shall order it to cease [...] and may impose a fine of less than 500,000 yuan”.
23 http://www.mwe.com/Chinas-Ministry-of-Commerce-Announces-Investigations-into-Failures-to-Notify-Concentration-
Introduces-New-Transparency-Measures-01-09-2013/
24 From The Economist, October 2012 (http://www.economist.com/node/21564274): “Though fewer in number, today’s SOEs
are more powerful than ever. One reason is that they can be vast (see chart) and so their market power is often greater in
a given industry. Their shrinking number is the result of a concerted effort to consolidate disparate SOEs into national
champions in a range of “strategic industries”, which range from telecoms to shipbuilding”.
25 It should be stressed that the economic literature does not exclude that lower levels of competition in emerging markets
may sometimes be desirable. That would be the case, for example, if restrictions of competition are deemed indispensable
to guarantee incentives to develop new technologies in a weak institutional setting (Laffont, 1998). However, there is a
consensus that proper enforcement of competition policy and in particular of merger control would be beneficial to
domestic economies even at an early stage of their development for fostering productive efficiency, for example (see Rey,14
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1997, for an analysis of competition policy in developing markets). There is little support for biased enforcement of
competition law that would favour domestic companies in emerging markets relative to their foreign competitors (most
notably: Singh, 2002, arguing that competition authorities in emerging economies should relax merger control against
domestic mergers but not against multinational companies).
26 For a recent analysis of antitrust private litigation in China see: Lu and Tan (2013). Until mid-2012, 107 cases were dealt
with by lower courts in China. Most of those were cases of alleged abuse of dominance. Only three cases reached the
appeal Courts: Renren v. Baidu, Li Fangping v. China Netcom, Huzhou Yiting Termite v. Huzhou City Termite. All of these
cases were won by the plaintiffs. Other high profiles antitrust cases that have been recently dealt with by Chinese courts
include: Beijing Ruibang Yonghe Technology-Johnson & Johnson, Huawei-InterDigital, Qihoo-Tencent.
27 Note that Tetra Pack has a long history of tying antitrust allegations with EU and US antitrust authorities (for the EU, see Case
T-51/89 Tetra Pak Rausing SA v Commission (Tetra Pak I), ECR II-309, Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak International SA v Commission
(Tetra Pak II)).
28 http://www.omm.com/china-rice-noodle-cartel-04-02-2010/.
29 http://www.industryweek.com/global-economy/china-fines-unilever-after-it-sparked-panic-buying.
30 This is based on only cartel cases handled by the European Commission for the EU and by NDRC for China. That is: only
major cases are considered – national and local cases normally handled by member states in Europe and SAIC in China
are excluded from the analysis.
31 See footnote 5.
32 This issue was discussed during the Singapore Ministerial held in 1996, at which WTO ministers launched working groups
on trade and investment, trade and competition and transparency in government procurement. These topics together with
trade facilitation collectively took the name of Singapore Issues. Despite the attempts to start substantive negotiations
made before and during the Doha Development Round started in 2001, however, the discussion on harmonisation of
competition policy issues was dropped in 2004, because of opposition from developing countries.
33 http://chillingcompetition.com/2013/08/02/review-of-chinas-anti-monopoly-law-the-first-five-years-adrian-emch-
david-stallibrass-eds/.
34 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-250_en.htm.
35 http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1442dff4-df16-4665-82f0-9ac66a70c0cd.
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